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INTRODUCTION
Germany’s Renewable Energy Act (EEG), adopted in 2000, played a decisive role 
for the remarkable development and deployment of renewable energy technologies 
in Germany between 2000 and 2012, and of a capital goods industry able to fulfil 
that task. It was controversial with some actors from the beginning, essentially 
with those who opposed its philosophy of an active government’s role in the 
far-reaching transformation of the electricity sector, either for ideological reasons 
(because they would leave things to the “market”) or for reasons of self interest 
(fossil fuel incumbents threatened by the advance of renewables). However, only 
since about 2009 has the EEG come in for radical attack from the government. 
The chief argument behind its discourse is that the transformation of the energy 
system (Energiewende in German) has become too expensive, threatens to sap 
Germany’s economic strength and, therefore, needs to be slowed down and made 
“affordable”. Our goal is to critically analyse this argument by showing that the 
cost calculations used are highly political in what they take into account and what 
they neglect, even if they may reach their aim of curtailing Energiewende.
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In 2000, the EEG replaced the 1991 Feed-in-Law. It introduced fixed and 
technology-specific cost covering payments per kWh for 20 years; automatically 
decreasing payments for new investments; unlimited obligation by grid operators 
to buy all tendered electricity from renewable sources and priority dispatch. EEG 
led to i) growth of renewable power production from 29 TWh in 1999 to 144 TWh 
in 2012, ii) 1.3 million owners of decentralised power plants in 2012 and iii) a Ger-
man industry employing over 350 000 in 2011.1 EEG is an unusual and, in some 
important ways, successful policy which draws its legitimacy from a long history of 
concern over the risks of nuclear power, forest dieback and climate change. The 
legitimacy was continuously nurtured by a strong social movement which focused 
on the long-term total impact – and costs – of energy supply.2
The large utilities, the energy intensive industry, the Conservative and Liberal Party 
leaderships and, on several occasions, the Ministry of Economic Affairs attempted, 
however, to undermine or stop even the modest 1991 Feed-in law and vigorously 
fought the EEG, both its initial adoption and its subsequent extension in 2004. A 
temporary pragmatic consensus between Conservatives and Social Democrats 
ended when a Conservative-Liberal coalition came to power in 2009, arguing 
the need to restrict the “excessive” deployment of renewables in order to make 
Energiewende “affordable”. EU energy commissioner Oettinger fuelled the critique 
of the EEG as did some academics who suggested that the EEG surcharge levied 
on consumers to finance investment in renewables constitutes a large “burden” 
on electricity consumers. A clear shift in the discourse took place from a focus on 
long-term total costs of energy supply to short-term consumer costs. In early 2013, 
the Minister of the Environment, Peter Altmaier responded by submitting legislation 
to stop the increase in electricity bills supposedly caused by the EEG and Liberal 
members of the government even suggested discarding the EEG entirely.3
The German debate on “affordability” spilled over to many EU countries, rais-
ing legitimacy questions over this form of support and associated technologies. 
For instance, it is present in the European Commission’s Green Paper which 
discusses policy for 2030 and where it is argued that a central consideration for 
future policies is “concerns of households about the affordability of energy and of 
businesses with respect to competitiveness”.4 Another example is the head of the 
Committee on Industry in the Swedish Parliament, M. Odell, who explicitly links the 
German price of electricity (for non-privileged customers) of about 28 eurocents to 
1  Arbeitsgemeinschaft Energiebilanzen (AGEB) (2013) Bruttostromerzeugung in Deutschland von 1990 bis 2013 nach Energi-
eträgern. Berlin, Germany: AGEB; German Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (FME) 
(2012) Development of renewable energy sources in Germany 2011. Berlin, Germany: FME. 
2  Jacobsson, S. and Lauber, V. (2006) The politics and policy of energy system transformation: explaining the German diffusion 
of renewable energy technology, Energy Policy, 34(3):256–276; Dewald, U. and Truffer, B. (2012) The local sources of market 
formation: explaining regional growth differentials in German photovoltaic market, European Planning Studies, 20(3):397-420.
3  Frondel, M. et al. (2010) Economic impacts from the promotion of renewable energy technologies: The German experience. 
Energy Policy 38(8):4048–4056; German Environment Ministry Plans to Cap Subsidies for Renewables (2013). Der Spiegel, Jan. 
29 [accessed 2014-06-16].
4  EC (2013) A framework for climate and energy policies. Green Paper. Brussels, Belgium: European Commission. (COM 
(2013) 0169).
151
wind power policy.5 Yet, a simple calculation reveals that the impact was at most in 
the order of 0.3 eurocents/kWh in 2012.6
Hence, the perhaps most successful regulatory framework for promoting the 
deployment of renewables, and an associated growth of innovative capital goods 
industries, was contested from its start. Moreover, it is contested with increasing 
ferocity at the same time as the International Energy Agency warns about the 
prospect of towards five degrees global warming.7 
In this chapter, we reflect on the German cost discourse with special emphasis on 
the notion of “affordability”. We discuss how the discourse (i) misrepresents the 
impact of the EEG surcharge on consumer costs and (ii) exaggerates the “burden” 
from renewable electricity by shifting focus from total cost to consumer cost. 
These two themes involve ascertaining how costs are calculated and therefore 
what is meant by “cost-efficiency”, “subsidy” and “affordability”. We then proceed 
to discuss (iii) inter-generational equity issues arising from our (in)ability to foster 
the development of new capital goods industries with innovative capabilities. In 
the final section we identify two complementary explanations of the ferocity of the 
discourse.
MISREPRESENTING THE EEG SURCHARGE’S IMPACT ON CONSUMER 
COST
The EEG surcharge is usually discussed as the “extra cost” of renewable electric-
ity supported by EEG payments which is charged to consumers, i.e. the price gap 
to conventional electricity (fossil or nuclear) as reflected in spot-market prices. It 
was initially low but rose to 1.2, 3.5 and 5.3 eurocents in 2008, 2011 and 2013, 
respectively.8 It would be easy to conclude that there is a growing “burden” on 
consumers. However, the surcharge is only one element of consumer price – in 
2011, it accounted for 14 per cent of household electricity prices,9 and grew to 
about 18.5 per cent by 2013. In addition, had the extra costs from EEG installa-
tions been allocated evenly across all electricity consumers and other distortions 
been removed, the “burden” from compensating EEG installations in 2013 would 
have been – according to an analysis widely referred to10 – 2.3 cents/kWh instead 
of 5.3 cents.11 This may well be argued not to be an overly large share of a con-
sumer price of about 28 eurocents. 
5  Odell, M. (2014) Dags att trappa ner stöden till vindkraft. SvD Opinion. Jan. 27 [accessed 2014-06-16]. 
6  In 2012, wind power supply was 51 TWh and was remunerated by 8.8 eurocents/kWh. The spot price for electricity was 
5.4 eurocents/kWh, see Arbeitsgemeinschaft Energiebilanzen (AGEB) (2013) Bruttostromerzeugung in Deutschland von 1990 
bis 2013 nach Energieträgern. Berlin, Germany: AGEB; Kuechler, S. and Meyer, B. (2012) Was Strom wirklich kostet. Berlin, 
Germany: Forum Ökologisch-Soziale Mark twirtschaft (FÖS). The extra cost of wind power then equals 1734 million EUR. Dividing 
with a total electricity consumption of 607 TWh, we come to an added cost of 0.29 eurocents/kWh. This overestimates the added 
cost as it ignores merit-order effects of wind power (reducing spot market prices) and subsidies for conventional generation 
(increasing the gap between wind power feed-in tariffs and spot market prices). 
7 International Energy Agency (IEA) (2013) Redrawing the energy-climate map, World Energy Outlook Special Report. Paris, 
France: OECD/IEA.
8  German Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (2012) Renewable Energy Sources
in Figures. Berlin, Germany: FME,
9  Traber, T., Kemfert, C. and Diekmann, J. (2011) Weekly Report. German Electricity Prices: Only Modest Increase Due to 
Renewable Energy expected. German Institute for Economic Research 6(7):37-46..
10 Bundesverband Erneuerbare Energie e. V. (BEE) (2012) BEE-Hintergrund zur EEG-Umlage 2013. Berlin, Germany: BEE.
11 The cost will increase to 2.54 cents in 2014, see Fraunhofer ISE (2013) Aktuelle Fakten zur Photovoltaik in Deutschland. Fig. 
15, p.18. Freiburg, Germany: Fraunhofer ISE.
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The discrepancy means that there are other cost components in the surcharge. 
First, a growing range of industries is largely exempted from the surcharge.12 In 
2013, this industry privilege amounted to 1.3 eurocents/kWh, i.e. this part of the 
“burden” was shifted from industrial firms to small consumers, mostly households 
and small business.
A second factor increasing the surcharge in 2013 is the reduced spot price of 
electricity due to the merit-order effect (induced by a growing supply of renew-
able electricity with priority dispatch status), falling coal prices and declining ETS 
certificate prices.13 This meant that the gap between the spot price for electricity 
and the feed-in rates widened, increasing the need for compensation. This effect 
was estimated by to account for 0.69 cents/kWh in 2013 and would constitute a 
benefit rather than a “burden” if the reduced spot price led to reduced household 
consumer costs, which it does not.14 As it was, this only benefited industrial firms 
negotiating their own contracts. 
Third, another 0.69 cents was due to balance the surcharge account for 2012, 
i.e. payments decided on in 2011 were not sufficient to cover the year’s cost. This 
constitutes only a temporary increase in the surcharge. 
SHIFTING FOCUS FROM TOTAL COST TO CONSUMER PRICE
The shift from total costs to consumer price means that significant cost items are 
left out of the analysis. The first are external costs which are those that electricity 
suppliers and users impose on others without paying for the consequences. These 
costs are real in that they involve damages, e.g. those who suffer from respiratory 
diseases or are affected by damages to buildings and those who suffer directly 
from more frequent climate-related draughts and storms. They are also real for 
those who have to pay for adjustments to various effects of climate change, for 
example, the costs of avoiding the flooding of coastal cities. The present “afford-
ability” discourse ignores these cost items altogether or considers the EU emis-
sion trading scheme as an adequate answer, which at current prices it is not (and 
which does not cover all types of emissions). 
While calculating external costs of electricity generation is fraught with difficulties, 
the German Federal Environment Agency estimates these to be about 11 and 9 
12  Industry includes not only energy-intensive firms facing international competition but also golf courses, newspapers and 
cheese makers (Germany to Exempt 1 550 Firms From Power Price Surcharge (2012) Der Spiegel, Dec. 24; European Commis-
sion Plans to Probe German Renewable Energy Law (2013) Der Spiegel, Jul. 15). The initial regulations gave exemptions to firms 
using more than 10 GWh a year but this was lowered in several steps (Dohmen, F. and Pauly, C. and Traufetter, G. (2013) Euro-
pean Commission Set to Fight German Energy Subsidies Der Spiegel - Spiegel Online, May 29). Exempted industry pays some 
of the lowest electricity prices in Europe, non-exempted industry one of the highest (Strompreis-Kluft spaltet deutsche Industrie 
(2014) IWR - Institute of the renewable energy industry, Oct 24 [accessed 2014-06-17]). Fraunuhofer ISE reports that 53% of the 
electricity consumed by industry was associated with payment of a reduced surcharge (Fraunhofer ISE (2013) Aktuelle Fakten zur 
Photovoltaik in Deutschland. Fig. 15, p.18. Freiburg, Germany: Fraunhofer ISE.). Industry uses almost half of all electricity, house-
holds about one quarter. 
13  From a peak at 6.8 Ct/kWh in 2009, spot market prices fell about 28% to 4.8 Ct in 2013 (Fraunhofer ISE 2013).
14  Bundesverband Erneuerbare Energie e. V. (BEE) (2012) BEE-Hintergrund zur EEG-Umlage 2013. Berlin, Germany: BEE. See 
also Tveten, A., Bolkesjo, T.F., Martinsen, T. and Hvarnes, H. (2013) Solar feed-in tariffs and the merit order effect: A study of the 
German electricity market. Energy Policy 61:761-770. This phenomenon (reduced spot prices not being passed on to consumers) 
is usually attributed to lack of competition among suppliers and the fact that suppliers strongly rely on futures so that price reduc-
tions are not reflected immediately; some also perceive a lack of market supervision and abuse of the “basic supply” tariff.
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eurocents/kWh for soft and hard coal respectively.15 These estimates are used by 
Kuechler and Meyer who add a second ignored cost item, subsidies channelled 
through the state budget, to estimate the total costs of electricity.16 Table 14.1 
contains their cost estimates (column 1), volume of electricity supplied by various 
technologies (column 2) and total costs associated with each technology in 2012.
A weighted average cost per kWh is then calculated for the present stock of 
onshore wind, hydro and PV as well as for hard and soft coal generation facilities – 
coal being the dominant source of electricity in Germany. In the table, we use the 
term legacy cost for renewables since it averages payments to earlier installations, 
with higher tariffs, and those to new installations, with lower tariffs.
Table 14.1: An estimate of the weighted average total cost of electricity supply for renewables versus coal in Ger-
many in 2012
Technology
Total cost 
(cents/kWh)
Electricity supply 
(TWh/year)
Total costs 
(billion EUR/year)
Renewables (weighted average legacy cost) 15.4
Onshore wind 8.0 51 4.1
Hydro 7.6 22 1.7
PV 36.7 26 9.5
Coal (weighted average cost) 15.3
Hard coal 14.8 116 17.2
Soft coal 15.6 159 24.8
Sources: Kuechler and Meyer (2012); AGEB (2013).
As Table 14.1 shows, the weighted average cost per kWh of the three renewables 
is the same as that of coal and the cost of onshore wind and hydro is much below, 
i.e. these are not subsidised but cost-efficient. Thus, the “burden” of renewables 
is negligible when total costs are considered. The contrast with analyses failing to 
include external costs and subsidies is sharp. An example is Frondel et al. (2010):
“…utilities are obliged to accept the delivery of power….into their own 
grid…paying…feed –in tariffs far above their own production costs…even 
on-shore wind…requires feed-in tariffs that exceed the per kWh cost of 
conventional electricity by up to 300% to remain competitive”.
As Table 14.1 also shows, the historically very high feed-in rates of PV as legacy 
costs have a large impact on the weighted average cost. These are, however, sunk 
costs and should not form the basis for decisions on future deployment. Current 
PV feed-in rates are, indeed, much lower (e.g. 9.5 to 13.7 eurocents in January 
15  Umweltbundesamt (UBA) (2012) Methodenkonvention 2.0 zur Schätzung von Umweltskosten. Dessau-Rosslau, Germany: 
UBA; Umweltbundesamt (UBA) (2012a) Schätzung der Umweltkosten in den Bereichen Energie und Verkehr. Dessau- Rosslau, 
Germany: UBA.
16  Kuechler and Meyer (2012) calculate total costs for coal power by adding three cost components: a) market price of electricity 
b) subsidies and c) not internalised external costs. As an example, the cost components for hard coal were 5.4, 1.9 and 7.5 euro-
cents respectively. For renewable energy technologies, they add the feed-in cost to subsidies and not internalised external costs. 
We are uncertain how much of the hydropower that receives feed-in remuneration.
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2014).17 As external costs and subsidies are low, even PV is now becoming com-
petitive with coal in terms of total costs which implies that, henceforth, coal power 
is the cost-inefficient option. Moreover, when green-house gases accumulate, the 
external cost of fossil fuel use will rise.18 
To conclude, with these German estimates of external costs and subsidies, it 
is evident that the cost discourse grossly exaggerates the “burden” of renewa-
bles and raises strong doubts about arguments referring to “cost-efficiency”, 
“subsidies” and “affordability” when these terms are used in ways that neglect 
important cost items. Yet, any consumer cost increase puts low-income house-
holds under pressure and these have, of course, to be shielded from the cost of 
transformation.19
SHIFTING FOCUS FROM LONG-TERM BENEFITS TO SHORT-TERM 
COSTS
The shift in focus from long-term benefits, in the form of e.g. avoidance of impacts 
of climate change20 to short-term costs means that the discourse has come to 
ignore large inter-generational equity issues. Renewables are a major require-
ment for the civilised survival of future generations, not just one possible option 
among others (See Chapter 3 for an appraisal of the potential of renewables 
to fully replace fossil fuels). If we accept this, there are large inter-generational 
positive externalities coming from building capital goods industries and developing 
technologies that will be able to provide a rapidly rising volume of “low-carbon” 
electricity, at reasonable consumer prices, as other energy sources are phased 
out in the second quarter of this century. 
For this to happen, a short-term focus on costs must be replaced by a long-term 
view allowing for the decades long time-scale in the development and diffusion of 
new technologies.21 In the innovation system literature, efforts have been put into 
assessing the length and character of the “formative phase” in which the technol-
ogy is “put on the shelf”, i.e. a rudimentary capital goods industry is developed 
that provides a technology with a reasonable price-performance ratio.22 This 
phase often takes a couple of decades and two to three additional decades may 
be required to increase the capacity of the capital goods sector and deploy the 
technology (in further improved forms) until the market is saturated. 
17  Solarförderverein (2013), http://www.sfv.de/lokal/mails/sj/verguetu/htm
18  Umweltbundesamt (UBA) (2012a) Schätzung der Umweltkosten in den Bereichen Energie und Verkehr. Dessau- Rosslau, 
Germany: UBA. argues that these may increase from 80 EUR/t to 145 EUR/t in 2030.
19  See for example discussion in: International Energy Agency (IEA) (2013) Energy Policies of IEA Countries, Germany, 2013 
Review. Paris, France: OECD/IEA.
20  Additional expected benefits are reduced problematic imports and reduced consumer costs of electricity as renewable tech-
nologies come down in price.
21  Grübler, A. (1996) Time for a change: On the patterns of diffusion of innovation. Daedalus 125(3); Carlsson, B. and 
Jacobsson, S. (1997) Variety and Technology Policy - how do technological systems originate and what are the policy conclu-
sions? In Edquist, C. (ed). Systems of Innovation: Technologies, Institutions and Organizations, London, UK: Pinter; Jacobsson, S. 
et. al. (2009) EU renewable energy support policy: Faith or facts? Energy Policy 37(6): 2143–2146; Wilson, C. (2012) Up-scaling, 
formative phases, and learning in the historical diffusion of energy technologies, Energy Policy 50:81–94.
22  Jacobsson, S. and Bergek, A. (2004) Transforming the energy sector: the evolution of technological systems in renewable 
energy technology. Industrial and Corporate Change, 13(5):815:849; Suurs, R. (2009) Motors of sustainable innovation. Towards 
a theory on the dynamics of technological innovation systems. Innovation Studies Group, Copernicus Institute, Utrecht University; 
MacKerron, G. (2011) Renewable energy and innovation policies: European experience. Presentation. International workshop on 
Innovation policies and structural change in a context of growth and crisis. Rio de Janeiro, Sep.13-15.
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Onshore wind and PV have gone through the formative phase and can now be 
deployed on a large scale with total costs lower than coal (Table 14.1). The 1991 
feed-in law and EEG greatly contributed to the formation of capital goods indus-
tries and the maturation of these two technologies. Another potential large source 
of low-carbon electricity in Germany is offshore wind power but this innovation 
system is still in the formative phase (see Chapters 15-16). The annually installed 
new capacity of offshore wind turbines in Europe increased from 0.9 GW in 2010 
to 1.2 GW in 2012 and is estimated to increase to 1.9 GW in 2014. If we are to 
reach the targets for the EU of 44 GW in 202023 and 200-300 GW by 2050,24 
the addition of new power plants needs to grow to almost 10 GW per year in the 
coming decade and thereafter remain at that level. 
A northern European supply chain is, indeed, being developed and Germany is 
integral to this effort, both as a market and a supplier of capital goods and ser-
vices. Danish and German firms dominate the market and large investments are 
made in the whole value chain, including harbours, to develop a supply capacity. 
However, the proposed cap on EEG payments by Minister of the Environment, 
Peter Altmaier (see above) led to large political uncertainties and made investors 
hesitant. Ronny Meyer, managing director of industry association WAB, informed 
that “the market has collapsed” and, in summer 2013, the Cuxhaven harbour, 
which invests substantially in infrastructure to enable deployment of turbines, sent 
out a plea to the government to reduce uncertainties.25 Hence, the discourse focus 
on short-term consumer costs, and the associated political uncertainties, puts at 
risk the formation of a supply chain large enough to develop and deploy offshore 
wind turbines on the required scale, in time and at a reasonable cost.
Offshore wind is just one example of a technology that is far from being “market 
ready” and in need of support such as the one granted by EEG in the past. Other 
technologies – more relevant for other countries than Germany – include wave and 
tidal power and concentrated solar power. For their early availability, and thus for 
phasing out fossil fuels and – in the European case – for reducing dependence on 
energy imports, it makes a big difference whether they are only supported by R&D 
or also by an appropriate level of market creation of the kind achieved by EEG in 
the past.
The focus on short-term costs obscures the need to form growing protective 
market spaces to take the technologies through their formative phase and into the 
growth phase. With the long time-scales involved (and associated learning costs), 
current investments should not only be judged by their present costs but also by 
their contribution to reduce future costs of avoiding climate change by enabling 
23  This is the current targets of EU member states, see Beurskens, L., Hekkenberg, M. and Vethman, P. (2011) Renewable 
Energy Projections as Published in the National Renewable Energy Action Plans of the European Member States. Petten, the 
Netherlands: ECN and EEA. (ECN-E--10-069). In our scenario, the 2020 goal of 44 GW is reached in 2022.
24  In European Commission (2011) Energy Roadmap 2050, Impact assessment and scenario analysis. Brussels, Belgium: Euro-
pean Commission (SEC (2011) 1565)., the average supply of offshore wind power in five decarbonisation scenarios is 818 TWh 
which is equal to 234 GW installed capacity with a 40% capacity factor.
25  Der Spiegel (2013b); Bündnis unterzeichnet Cuxhavener Appell (2013) Handelsblatt Aug. 26 [accessed 16 Oct 2013].
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the development of a capital goods sector and other parts of the supply chain. An 
appropriate cost concept should therefore also include long-term benefits from 
learning, strengthening the economic case of renewables further.26
The German Liberals, some economists, the German Council of Economic 
Experts and the Monopoly Commission maintain, however, a short-term view and 
argue that a reduction in the “burden” would be achieved by a quota system, such 
as the Swedish “technology-neutral” system of tradable green certificates in the 
electricity system for renewables.27 Unlike the highly differentiated German feed-in 
system, such a system – unless it provides for technology banding (i.e. granting 
more certificates for specific technologies, a crude imitation of the differentiation 
allowed by feed-in tariffs)28 – provides incentives to invest in only the currently 
most cost-efficient technologies and may, therefore, appear attractive with today’s 
German cost discourse.29
Yet, it does not drive technical change more than incrementally since it does not 
stimulate the formation of the markets required to induce the build-up of new 
supply chains until lower-cost technologies have saturated their markets.30 In 
response, it is often argued that immature technologies should not be fostered by 
market formation policies but rather by R&D policy. For instance, Frondel et al., 
2010, p. 4055, argue that: “ …one should have abstained from strongly subsidiz-
ing the market penetration of relatively immature PV technologies. Rather, from an 
economic perspective, R&D funding should have increased first”. 
It is, however, only in the much criticised linear model of innovation that the 
innovation process constitutes a smooth flow down a one-way street,31 i.e. where 
research leads to development, development to production and production to 
market diffusion and where, hence, (academic) R&D is sufficient for driving innova-
tion and cost-reductions. 
Of course, R&D is required throughout the life-cycle of a technology, but it has 
to be supplemented by market formation in order to stimulate the formation of a 
capital goods sector and induce it to conduct R&D, product development and 
other measures that drive down cost (e.g. standardisation efforts). Hence, while 
in the linear model markets materialise after a technology is fully developed, real 
life technologies co-evolve with markets. The limitation of a pure quota system 
26  See e.g. Sandén, B. (2005) The economic and institutional rationale of PV subsidies, Solar Energy, 78(2):137-146; Sandén, B. 
and Karlström, M. (2007) Positive and negative feedback in consequential life-cycle assessment, Journal of Cleaner Production 
15(15): 1469–1481.
27  Frondel, M. et al. (2010) Economic impacts from the promotion of renewable energy technologies: The German experience. 
Energy Policy 38(8):4048–4056; Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung (2012) 
Jahresgutachten 2012/13, chapter 7 (III), 279-297, [2013-10-31]; Monopoly Commission (2013) Monopoly Commission publishes 
Special Report on the situation of competition on the energy markets. Press release. [2014-06-30].
28  Such banding (introduced in the UK Renewables Obligation) also makes a quota system more expensive. 
29  It should be noted that the German association of electricity incumbents does not think that this system is able to resolve cur-
rent problems and now supports market premiums, see IWR (2013) Empfehlungen der Monopol-Kommission: Energiewirtschaft 
lehnt das Quotenmodell ab, Sep. 5 [accessed 2013-10-28].
30  Jacobsson et al., 2009; Bergek, A. and Jacobsson, S. (2010) Are Tradable Green Certificates a cost-efficient policy driving 
technical change or a rent-generating machine? Lessons from Sweden 2003-2008. Energy Policy, 38:1255–1271. See also Azar, 
C. and Sandén, B. (2011) The elusive quest for technology-neutral policies. Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions 
1(1):135–139, on the concept of “technology-neutrality”.
31  Kline, S. and Rosenberg, N. (1986) An Overview of Innovation. In The Positive Sum Strategy: Harnessing Technology for 
Economic Growth, Washington DC, USA: National Academy Press.
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(without technology banding) is, thus, that it does not contribute much to “putting 
new technologies on the shelf”32 through providing the time and markets required 
for fostering new capital goods industries with innovative capabilities.33 An exten-
sive use of a quota system would, therefore, mean that we risk failing to provide 
future generations with the ability to supply carbon-neutral electricity on a large 
scale with technologies that have gone through decades of improvement. 
CONCLUDING DISCUSSION – TOWARDS EXPLAINING THE FEROCITY 
OF THE DISCOURSE
In sum, the cost discourse is not only extremely weak and misleading but also fero-
cious. We conclude by pointing to a few contributing explanations to its ferocity, 
acknowledging that there are more. 
The German discourse is not unique but reflects a broader, partly ideological, 
debate between those arguing the advantages of industry- or technology-neutral 
policies34 and those advocating a more powerful state implementing industry or 
technology-specific policies. The latter also highlight the capital goods industry 
as a bridge between policy, market formation and technical change and the long 
time-scale involved in building such industries.
In the former camp of the German debate, we find those who (i) emphasise high 
consumer costs of new technologies and not their total costs; (ii) take a short-
term view on both costs and required learning periods; (iii) neglect or play down 
the role of market formation in innovation and cost reduction and (iv) neglect the 
volume of past development and deployment support to conventional generation 
which reached hundreds of billions of EUR.
In the latter, we find those who (i) emphasise total costs, including costs for 
environmental degradation; (ii) take a long-term view on costs and required 
learning periods and (iii) argue that market formation is central to innovation and 
cost reduction. To an extent, the ferocity of the debate can be explained by these 
diametrically opposite views on the nature of large-scale transformation processes 
and the different roles to be played by the state. 
As much of the debate has centred on the cost of PV, it is though important to 
acknowledge that in 2010-2012, the inordinate cost of new PV installations in 
Germany (22.5 GW in three years) impacted very strongly on the surcharge (Table 
14.1). The problem arose because the price of modules decreased much faster 
than the feed-in tariff, creating extra profits and drawing new investors – and 
because no decisive steps were taken in time. But this is a legacy cost item in 
the surcharge that will not come down even if a quota system is installed today. 
32  Sandén, B. A. and Azar, C. (2005) Near-term technology policies for long-term climate targets—economy wide versus technol-
ogy specific approaches. Energy Policy, 33:1557-1576.
33  As the diffusion of renewables increases, there is a growing need for additional policies to support e.g. demand-side manage-
ment (Chapter 10), electric grids (Chapter 9) and energy storage technologies (Chapter 5 and 12). For the latter, the German 
government has a programme involving 100 million EUR in investment support just for batteries connected to small PV systems. 
Grid financing also takes place outside of the EEG.
34  Although these are inspired by neoclassical economics, it is noteworthy that some neoclassical analysts participating in the 
debate, e.g. Frondel, M. et al. (2010) Economic impacts from the promotion of renewable energy technologies: The German expe-
rience. Energy Policy 38(8):4048–4056, neglect external costs. 
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In a long-term perspective, the central observation is that PV has now become 
so cheap that the impact of its future deployment on the surcharge will be very 
modest.
Yet, the divide is also due to genuinely conflicting economic interests of firms. 
Schumpeter once argued that
… in capitalist reality as distinguished from its textbook picture, it is not 
that kind of competition35 which counts but competition from the new 
commodity, the new technology, the new source of supply, the new type 
of organization — competition which commands a decisive cost or qual-
ity advantage and which strikes not at the margins of the profits and the 
outputs of existing firms but at their foundations and very lives.36
The large utilities which neglected to invest significantly in renewable generation 
are now threatened by declining market shares and lower prices for conventional 
generation, particularly at hours of peak demand when PV is abundant (see Chap-
ter 2 and 11). In a perhaps overstated case of their pain, the Economist argues 
that deployment of renewables creates an “existential threat” to the large utilities, 
stating that 
The country’s biggest utility, E.ON, has seen its share price fall by three-
quarters…and its income from conventional power generation…fall by 
more than a third since 2010. At the second-largest utility, RWE…net 
income has also fallen a third since 2010. As the company’s chief financial 
officer laments, “conventional power generation, quite frankly, as a busi-
ness unit, is fighting for its economic survival”.37
The current wave of investment in new coal generation plants in Germany – one of 
the biggest since post-war reconstruction– is likely to exacerbate that problem.38 
Indeed, Becker (2011) paints a dramatic picture of the prevailing relations between 
the two systems, fossil vs. renewables: two trains headed for each other at full 
speed on the same track, with a crash impending.39 Hence, behind the ferocity 
of the discourse also lurk the vested interests of a threatened industry, forming 
a discourse coalition with those arguing for a passive state, aiming to protect a 
status quo which threatens future generations (see also Chapter 13). 
35  “That kind of competition” refers to price competition and competition within a rigid pattern of invariant conditions, methods of 
production and forms of industrial organisation.
36  Schumpeter, J. (1943) Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. New York, NY, USA: Harper.
37  European utilities: How to lose half a trillion euros. Europe’s electricity providers face an existential threat (2013) The Econo-
mist, Oct. 13. [accessed 2013-10-06]. In 2013, RWE made its first loss in sixty years, though only partly in connection with 
Energiewende.
38  International Energy Agency (IEA) (2013) Energy Policies of IEA Countries, Germany, 2013 Review. Paris, France: OECD/
IEA.
39  Becker, P. (2011) Aufstieg und Krise der deutschen Stromkonzerne. Bochum, Germany: Ponte Press Verlag GmbH.
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Finally, the European Commission made several attempts in the past to ban 
“German-style” feed-in tariffs or at least to subject them to state aid control (which 
would probably come close to banning them). Up to now Germany was a strong 
opponent of such moves. Things are likely to be different with new Commission 
efforts under way in early 2014. In the name of affordability and industrial competi-
tiveness, these proposals aim to slow down the shift to renewables via low targets 
for 2030 (27 per cent overall, just seven per cent more than for 2020) and strict 
limits to support for technologies as soon as they have a European market share 
of 1-3 per cent.40 If adopted, this may well put an end to EEG-style energy system 
transformation and similar efforts elsewhere in the EU. It would be tragic if a weak 
and flawed cost discourse is allowed to contribute to such an ending.
40  EC (2013) Draft guidelines for environmental and energy State aid, 2014-2020. Brussels, Belgium: European Commission.
